Freedom of speech

Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, in his dissent in Abrams v. United States:

... But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.

Justice Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, in his concurrence to Whitney v. California:

Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law — the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of law-breaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.
Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.

On Sarah Palin and inspiration

This response to a friend's blog re-post got too long for the comment box. There are a few questions to explore:

1. Was Sarah Palin responsible in any way for the Giffords shooting?
2. What about her free speech rights?
3. How does this compare to Mark David Chapman reading Catcher in the Rye?

Was Sarah Palin responsible in any way for the Giffords shooting?

18 U.S.C § 2(a), which is an example of a statute criminalizing aiding and abetting a crime, reads as follows: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." The key words a jury would consider in this case are probably counsels and induces. A prosecutor would work to convince a jury that Palin's writings and rhetoric convincingly counseled violence or induced it in the attacker. It's not a requirement that Palin be a necessary element; it's not necessary to prove that this attack would not have happened without Palin's contribution. A jury would just have to decide that Palin suggested or supported such an action.

Frankly, it's pretty unlikely any jury would reach that conclusion.

What about Sarah Palin's free speech rights?

The Supreme Court decided in Brandenburg v. Ohio that some violent speech is protected by the First Amendment to the US Constitution. The Court decided that States could only criminalize speech "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." This is a high bar for a prosecutor to reach in this case. Palin's web site was not apparently inciting imminent lawless action, and I don't think a jury would find that it was likely to do so either. While the web site listed individual lawmakers by name, and included gun sights targeting their districts, there was no direct call for violence, and most reasonable visitors would likely understand by the context that this was a political "call to arms" since this was published by the Palin PAC.

However the case isn't quite that open and shut. In 2003 the Supreme Court issued a relevant decision in Virginia v. Black, a case involving a statute criminalizing cross burning. While the defendants there claimed the statute infringed their right to free speech, the Court upheld the State's right to criminalize this form of expression because it was a "true threat"; the history of cross burning made this activity less an expression and more an intimidation. Here there is no statute prohibiting a publication of individual names with violent imagery, so Palin is not violating any law. However, if there were such a law, a prosecutor defending a conviction might look for evidence that such web sites have led to violence (e.g., against abortion providers) and try to make a similar argument.

Can you compare the Giffords shooting to the death of John Lennon?

Not really; an ambitious prosecutor would point out some salient differences. In particular, Sarah Palin did mention individuals by name, and placed gun sights (a symbol associated with violence) on their specific districts; Salinger's character did not shoot anyone, and especially did not mention John Lennon or anyone remotely like him. Because of these important differences, you can't say that just because it's unreasonable to associate Salinger with Mark David Chapman, it's therefore unreasonable to say Sarah Palin influenced Jared Lee Loughner. I think it's more compelling to do the analysis of her case on its own.