I'm reading America's Prophets - How Judicial Activism Makes America Great by UH Law Center professor David Dow. In the book, Dow describes the function of the biblical prophets in ancient Israel as cultural course correctors; their role was to tell the public when their practices were contrary to higher law. The prophets were, in effect, the visionaries who had the courage to tell the majority "no" when necessary.
In contrast, the priests were the ones who maintained cultural continuity; it was their job to preside over and defend norms of long standing. It was their job to look to the past for guidance. This metaphor is from page 11:
... We can think of priests and prophets as judges taking a ride together on a train. The priests are seated facing the rear. They can see backward along the rails all the way back to the depot from which the train began its journey. They believe that their job is to be experts on all that has transpired between the origin of their culture and the location at which they reside at the moment. The prophets face sideways. Turning their heads one way, they see what the priests see. Turning their heads the opposite direction, they see forward. They cannot see to the end of the track, perhaps, bu they can see some distance into the future. Of course, to continue with this metaphor, there will be spots in the future that the prophetic judge, no matter how keen her vision cannot see. ... Nevertheless, the prophetic judge can see some distance into the future, and the prophetic judges believe that their job is to ascertain, based on the vector from which they have come, where they are going.
How is a US Supreme Court justice like a prophet in the Bible? In our political system, the Constitution provides the higher law, the foundational framework against which all legislation must be measured. Like the Jewish prophet who warns the people when they stray from their fundamental goals and principles, the activist judge is in the position of saying "no" to the Congress and the majority it represents, when the Congress (or a state) attempts to enact a law which runs counter to the Constitution. This is not a comfortable role for a judge to play; as any parent knows, saying "no" invites an emotional backlash. Without judges performing this role, however, we run the risk of subjecting less powerful groups to the tyranny of the majority, a concept first described by Alexis de Tocqueville, and later mentioned in the Federalist papers.
Are these "activist judges" imposing their personal morality, ethics, or interpretation of the Constitution on the rest of us? Or are their decisions based on a strict application of legal reasoning to the text and principles of the Constitution? Dow gives us the examples of Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education as examples of "priestly" and "prophetic" approaches to racial equality, and promises to visit other similarly controversial examples of "activism" later in the book. He asserts that the prophetic course corrections are grounded in good law and reasoning; they would have to be, given the decisions and rationale are all public. However, I've not yet read his analysis of the various cases; those are later in the book.
On a related note, can "activist" judges on the US Supreme Court be identified by their ideology? Some interesting research from Dow and collaborators:
A study of the last ten years of the Rehnquist Court reveals that a justice's deference score* depends on something besides a judge's simple belief that the majority should be free to do as it sees fit. For example, the same justices who are most willing to tell the majority no when Congress intrudes on individual liberty (i.e., Justices Stevens and Souter in the aforementioned study) are least willing to tell the majority no when Congress intrudes on the states. Conversely, the justices most protective of the states, and therefore most willing to tell Congress no when it interferes with state power (i.e., Justices Scalia and Thomas), are least willing to tell Congress no when it interferes with individual rights. ...
I'm not even half way through the book, and I find it fascinating, hard to put down. The idea of the judiciary as a brake on the majority is a concept I've been trying to articulate and logically frame for myself for a while, and here's a book by an author who's thought it through and is a compelling writer. I'm hooked.
* A judge's deference score describes how often a judge defers to Congress and the majority it represents. A judge receives a positive score (+1) for each time he or she votes or holds that the law is consistent with the Constitution, and need not change. A judge receives a negative score (-1) for each time he or she decides a law is unconstitutional.
1 comments:
Funny, I was just thinking this week about another judicial-religious parallel in matters of precedent: about the relative importance that the traditions developed over the ages have for our understanding of the law/scripture.
On a related note, assuming Kagan is approved, there would be no Protestants on the Supreme Court: six Catholics and three Jews.
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